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Posted by manualofideas at 01:02 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

It has become relatively common to read annual reports of companies that previously engaged in regular share buybacks yet mysteriously decided to halt the practice during 2009 even as share prices hit multi-year lows.  As The Economist has noted, share buybacks are making a comeback in 2010 just as markets are approaching levels last seen prior to September/October 2008. Why is this happening now and how should shareholders evaluate management decisions on buybacks?

A Rare Skill Set

Shareholders employ a Chief Executive Officer with an expectation that he or she will intelligently run the business in a manner that is likely to maximize profitability over long periods of time.  Over time and depending on the nature of the specific business, a good manager should be able to generate cash flow above and beyond maintenance capital expenditure requirements.

Operational excellence should ideally result in a growing pile of cash on a company’s balance sheet.  However, simply because a manager is good at running a business and generating free cash flow does not mean that the manager will intelligently deploy the free cash flow for benefit of the company’s owners.  Great operational managers are rare and so are great capital allocators.  It is exceedingly rare to find a manager who is excellent in both areas.

Reinvest or Return Cash to Owners?

When a manager finds that cash is building up on the balance sheet, a choice must be made:  Either the funds will be reinvested within the business or returned to shareholders.  Reinvestment can be accomplished through internal growth or through acquisitions of other companies while returning cash to shareholders can take the form of dividends or share buybacks.

There are a number of factors that naturally predispose  most operational managers to retain cash for reinvestment purposes:

First, excellent operational managers are normally optimists who have a history of seizing opportunities and finding success in areas where others may have failed.  Accordingly, such individuals often have a healthy opinion of their own capabilities and feel that cash in their hands may be used in intelligent ways within their current business.

Second, it is natural for most managers to want to build up the size of the company they oversee in terms of annual sales, number of locations, number of employees, etc.  When a manager says “I run a $10 billion company”, he is normally referring to annual sales volume rather than profitability. Just from an “ego” perspective, there is perceived value in running a larger enterprise.

Finally, and possibly most importantly, financial incentives often reward managers for growing the size of a business even if incremental returns on invested capital are substandard.  If you start with a business earning high returns on capital, incremental investments at inferior returns will only show up slowly in overall results and only be apparent to alert shareholders who are paying careful attention.

Share Buybacks or Dividends?

In cases where the CEO (or the Board of Directors) has decided that there are no legitimate opportunities for internal investment, there are primarily two ways in which excess cash can be returned to shareholders:  Share buybacks and dividends.  Many managers prefer buybacks for a few reasons:

First, a buyback reduces the number of shares outstanding and can mask the effect of option grants to executives and others in the organization.  In the absence of a buyback program, the share count of companies providing options to employees will creep up over time and make it more difficult for managers to achieve growth in reported earnings per share.

Second, managers who hold stock options have a clear incentive to favor buybacks over dividends.  Paying dividends reduces the intrinsic value of options since cash is flowing out of the business to shareholders while the option strike price remains unchanged.  In contrast, a share buyback effectively invests the cash on behalf of remaining shareholders in stock of the company itself which has a positive impact on option holders.

When Buybacks Make Sense

If a company has reached the point where free cash flow cannot be invested internally or via acquisition at acceptable rates of return, the cash should be returned to shareholders either through buybacks or dividends.  Buybacks are only appropriate when management believes that shares are trading at levels under a conservative estimate of intrinsic value.  When such buybacks occur, all remaining shareholders are better off because the intrinsic value of each share will increase and eventually be reflected in market prices.  In contrast, shares purchased indiscriminately at any price can destroy value when managers buy shares at inflated prices.

This leads to the question of whether managers who were repurchasing shares in 2007 and 2008 at high prices but failed to repurchase shares in 2009 were acting in the best interests of shareholders.  There are no blanket answers since each situation is different.  Many companies that had positive free cash flow in 2007 and 2008 were burning cash in 2009 due to the economic downturn.  Continuing a repurchase program even at lower prices could be ill advised if doing so depletes working capital that could cause financial distress or collapse.

Red Flags

When red flags should appear are cases where a company remained profitable and generated free cash flow throughout the economic downturn but mysteriously halted buybacks as the share price declined.  Such managements should answer for why they considered it appropriate to buy back shares at higher prices in 2007 and 2008 but  not at bargain prices in 2009.  There could be valid reasons such as a desire to keep dry powder available for acquisitions made possible by distressed conditions or ensuring that the company builds up even more cash reserves in case of a longer recession or depression.  However, the burden should be on management to explain this decision to shareholders in a coherent manner.  Building up cash far in excess of any conceivable need to protect the business could simply indicate that managers were hoarding cash to sleep well at night at the expense of owners of the business.

The author of this post is a private investor and writer focused on applying value investing techniques to find securities trading well below intrinsic business value. He is a Manual of Ideas contributor and editor of The Rational Walk.

Posted by manualofideas at 01:41 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

From The Wall Street Journal's Deal Journal:

Michael Burry and John Paulson both made a killing betting against the housing market.

As a result, the fortunes of Burry, Scion Capital’s founder, and Paulson, of Paulson & Co., have earned them spots as the subjects of books: Burry, as the subject of Michael Lewis’s “The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine,” and Paulson, as the subject of Wall Street Journal reporter Gregory Zuckerman’s “The Greatest Trade Ever.” Zuckerman also touches on Burry in his book.

But looking at the portraits from the two books, these two investors have more in common than their money. Here are some quirks Burry and Paulson share:

They were viewed as different, even socially awkward. Burry believed you had to be unusual to succeed. And he was. “He found it maddeningly difficult to read people’s nonverbal signals, and their verbal signals he often took more literally than they meant them. When trying his best, he was often at his worst,” Lewis writes.

Paulson, similarly, seemed different than his peers. They dressed casually; he wore ties and dark suits. They were making money; he wasn’t. “When he met with clients, they sometimes were surprised by his limp handshake and restrained manner, both unusual in an industry full of bluster,” Zuckerman writes.

Obsessive. Both lived inside their heads for hours at a time, reading hundred-plus-page mortgage-bond prospectuses and studying the housing market to plan their strategies.

“His mind had no temperate zone: he was either possessed by a subject or not interested in it at all,” Lewis writes of Burry.

Paulson’s growing fixation on housing even sparked doubts about his business, writes Zuckerman. “One long-time client, big Swiss bank Union Bancaire Privée, received an urgent warning from a contact that Mr. Paulson was “straying” from his longtime focus, and that the bank should pull its money from Paulson & Co., fast.”

But this obsessiveness likely helped the men in their search for investors supporting the risky bets against the housing market. By mid- 2005, “Burry’s fund was up 242%, and he was turning away investors.” And Paulson made $15 billion for his firm in 2007 alone. (Read an interview with Gregory Zuckerman in Newsweek.)

They did it their way. Neither Burry nor Paulson were experts in derivatives, mortgages or real estate. Burry, a former medical resident, was a self-taught investor, and Paulson focused specialized in corporate mergers.

“Burry did not think investing could be reduced to a formula or learned from any one role model. The more he studied [Warren] Buffett, the less he thought Buffett could be copied.” Lewis writes. “Indeed, the lesson of Buffett was: To succeed in a spectacular fashion you had to be spectacularly unusual.”

Posted by manualofideas at 09:44 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

In a guest post yesterday on the excellent Greenbackd blog, S. Raj Rajagopal made a case for shorting Berkshire Hathaway and followed up later with more details regarding valuation.  Mr. Rajagopal is an MBA student at Cornell and has work experience in the investment field.  It takes a great deal of courage to make a public case for shorting Berkshire given the company’s long history and loyal shareholder base.  We often discuss  psychological tendencies that harm investors and one such tendency is to dismiss opposing points of view without critical examination.  Mr. Rajagopal’s case deserves such examination before rendering a judgment.

“Adoration is not an investment strategy”

Mr. Rajagopal bases much of his initial post not on quantitative evidence but on the premise that adoration for Warren Buffett is not an investment strategy.  On this point he is clearly correct.  It makes no sense to simply purchase Berkshire Hathaway because of Warren Buffett’s track record.  Obviously some buyers of Berkshire stock make their decision purely based on Mr. Buffett’s track record.  However, any sophisticated investor understands that you do not purchase a security simply based on folksiness or admiration for a grandfatherly character. If Mr. Rajagopal intended his short case to be read by professionals, he begins with an obvious straw man argument.

Bailout Obsession

Having presented this initial warning against backward looking thinking, it is ironic that much of the rest of Mr. Rajagopal’s thesis simply looks at the past in an attempt to forecast the future without providing any substantial quantitative evidence.  For example, several slides in the initial presentation are devoted to Mr. Buffett’s investments in companies that were in financial distress in 2008.  Much is made of Mr. Buffett’s letter to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson offering to help construct an investment fund partly using $100 million of Mr. Buffett’s own personal fortune outside Berkshire Hathaway.  Of course, Mr. Buffett’s offer was never acted upon by Treasury.

Mr. Rajagopal goes on to lambast Berkshire as a “bailout baby” simply because Berkshire took large positions in companies that were in financial distress and then allegedly manipulated the political process to stack the deck in favor of Berkshire.  Mr. Buffett received numerous phone calls throughout the financial crisis with offers to invest in distressed firms at very attractive prices.  Should he have ignored such opportunities?  How is Mr. Buffett a “welfare queen” (why not a “bailout king”?) based on investments in which Berkshire’s capital was clearly at risk of loss and actually helped provide the votes of confidence that stabilized the system?  None of this is clear from the presentation.

Incorrect Reading of Buffett’s Statement on Berkshire Valuation

Mr. Rajagopal completely fails to interpret Mr. Buffett’s recent statements on Berkshire’s valuation and claims that the “Oracle of Omaha says Berkshire is overvalued now”.  This is obviously not the case.  As we pointed out in January, Mr. Buffett actually stated that Berkshire was undervalued at the time based on its historical relationship to book value and in his latest letter to shareholders, Mr. Buffett explains his rationale regarding using stock for the Burlington acquisition in great detail.  Berkshire’s stock price has advanced since the conclusion of the Burlington acquisition but Mr. Buffett has made no further comments to support Mr. Rajagopal’s claim that he believes the stock to be “overvalued now”.

Derivatives:  Ticking Time Bombs?

Mr. Rajagopal directly calls Mr. Buffett a “hypocrite” for warning about derivatives in 2002 and then investing in derivatives for Berkshire’s account.  It does not appear that Mr. Rajagopal has any grasp of the nature of Berkshire’s derivatives exposure and he offers no substantiation whatsoever for referring to the derivatives as ticking time bombs.  We discussed the misunderstandings related to Berkshire’s derivatives over a year ago and suggest that Mr. Rajagopal review the article or numerous others which explain the nature of these instruments in detail.

Filling Buffett and Munger’s Shoes

Mr. Rajagopal notes that male life expectancy in the United States is 74 years but does not point out that this is life expectancy at birth.  Mr. Buffett is 79 years old and has an actuarial life expectancy of over eight years.  Mr. Munger is 86 years old and has an actuarial life expectancy of over five years.

At the top of his slide he has a subtitle reading:  “David ‘who’ Sokol” in an apparent reference to Mr. Sokol being one of the more frequently cited candidates for CEO at Berkshire.  It is unfortunate that Mr. Rajagopal has decided that Mr. Sokol is unworthy and we would suggest a review of Pleased But Not Satisfied as a good starting point for Mr. Rajagopal to educate himself on one of Mr. Buffett’s potential successors.

Mr. Rajagopal seems to also have issues with the Burlington acquisition which we have discussed here frequently over the past three months.  However, he provides no valuation information and simply comes up with an “inevitable conclusion” that Mr. Buffett is seeking to “protect his franchise with a mammoth acquisition” prior to handing over the reins.  We are also told that “volatility” will increase due to S&P 500 inclusion and the stock split which will cause Berkshire to become a “volatile middle aged and mature stock”.

Seriously Flawed Valuation Model

After facing a barrage of criticism regarding his initial case for shorting Berkshire, Mr. Rajagopal produced a follow up post with his valuation model.  Unfortunately, the valuation only reinforces the impression that Mr. Rajagopal does not understand Berkshire Hathaway.  The following problems were noted in the model:

1. Earnings per share are used in the valuation model even though reported earnings per share for Berkshire are inadequate for judging progress in intrinsic value on a year to year basis because of the volatility to earnings caused by the timing of capital gains and losses as well as the mark to market requirements for the derivatives book.  In addition, many of Berkshire’s publicly traded holdings have earnings far in excess of paid dividends and Berkshire’s share of such earnings are not reported in Berkshire’s earnings figures.
2. Projections for earnings per share going forward are based on an average of the past five years in reported earnings growth which is purely backward looking and fails to take into account any of the drivers of reported earnings that have changed in recent years (purchase of high yielding securities such as the Goldman Sachs and GE Preferreds, acquisition of BNSF, etc).
3. Book Value progress each year is apparently calculated by adding starting year book value to earnings for the year which fails to account for any changes in book value associated with unrealized gains in Berkshire’s portfolio of publicly traded securities.
4. The model uses a 9% discount rate even though the “notes” section states that an 8% rate will be used.  This has a material long term impact on the valuation.  Neither the 8% or 9% rate is ever justified.
5. Target ROE is set at 10% “since BRK is so big” which is an inadequate explanation of a key variable used in the valuation.
6. The model produces prices at a discount to book value but no explanation is provided regarding what element of goodwill is impaired or why Berkshire would trade at a discount to book value which would be unprecedented.
7. The model mysteriously produces declining valuations for Berkshire after 2016 even though book value continues to grow.  At 2021, we have an absurd calculation of an $84 valuation along with an estimate of $209 of book value leading us to believe that Mr. Rajagopal believes that Berkshire’s price to book value will shrink to 0.40 over the next ten years.

It is difficult to know what to make of Mr. Rajagopal’s short thesis in light of the obvious flaws in both the original presentation and the follow up valuation model.  It took some courage for Mr. Rajagopal to offer a short case for Berkshire but unfortunately he completely failed to justify his thesis.

The author of this post is a private investor and writer focused on applying value investing techniques to find securities trading well below intrinsic business value. He is a Manual of Ideas contributor and editor of The Rational Walk.

Disclosure:  The author owns shares of Berkshire Hathaway and is the author of The Rational Walk’s Berkshire Hathaway 2010 Briefing Book which provides a detailed analysis of the company along with estimates of intrinsic value.

Posted by manualofideas at 12:13 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Another snippet:

Posted by manualofideas at 11:35 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bain & Company has released an interesting report for those with an interest in private equity.

(Thanks to Yaser Anwar for the link.)

Posted by manualofideas at 07:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

A Conversation with George Soros at HKU from JMSC HKU on Vimeo.

Posted by manualofideas at 06:55 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Roundtable w/ Soros et al: Make Markets Be Markets from Roosevelt Institute on Vimeo.

Q&A:

Q&A from Make Markets Be Markets from Roosevelt Institute on Vimeo.

Posted by manualofideas at 05:56 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

In a pattern that would be amusing if it was not so disturbing, we are again witnessing the spectacle of lawyers for a disgraced CEO who claim that their client was “unaware” of key risks that led to the downfall of their firm.  The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy examiners report has been widely covered in the business media over the past few days and, at a minimum, paints a picture of shocking incompetence and an intent to mislead among Lehman’s senior management team.  It is the type of scenario in which a former CEO’s only defense appears to rest on claims that he was incompetent rather than criminally negligent.

Repo 105 Transactions

The Wall Street Journal reports that Lehman management routinely engaged in “Repo 105″ transactions in an attempt to dress up the balance sheet prior to the end of financial reporting periods.  In a normal repurchase agreement, a borrower uses a financial security as collateral for a cash loan.  The agreement generally involves the sale of the collateral combined with a commitment to repurchase the same security at a point in the future at a higher price.  In a “Repo 105″ transaction, Lehman was able to book the transaction as if it was an outright sale rather than an ordinary repo transaction because the assets the firm moved were worth 105% or more of the cash it received in return.

Through this accounting maneuver, Lehman was able to appear less leveraged than it really was.  According to the Wall Street Journal, no United States based law firm would sanction this accounting treatment so Lehman secured an opinion letter from a London law firm named Linklaters.  If a U.S. based Lehman entity needed to engage in a Repo 105 transaction, it would have to move the security to a European division to execute the transaction.

Lehman executives are on record acknowledging the necessity of such transactions as the following quote from a Wall Street Journal article clearly demonstrates:

Four days prior to the close of the 2007 fiscal year, Jerry Rizzieri, a member of Lehman’s fixed-income division, was searching for a way to meet his balance-sheet target, according to the report. He wrote in an email: “Can you imagine what this would be like without 105?”

A day before the close of Lehman’s first quarter in 2008, other employees scrambled to make balance-sheet reductions, the report said. Kaushik Amin, then-head of Liquid Markets, wrote to a colleague: “We have a desperate situation, and I need another 2 billion from you, either through Repo 105 or outright sales. Cost is irrelevant, we need to do it.”

Grossly Negligent, Criminally Responsible, or Merely Incompetent?

Lehman’s CEO Dick Fuld is cited in the bankruptcy examiner’s report as being “at least grossly negligent” regarding the Repo 105 transactions:

The examiner wrote there was “sufficient evidence” to support a legal claim that Mr. Fuld was “at least grossly negligent for failing to ensure” Lehman filed proper financial statements about its accounting for the transactions, and that a key former executive of the firm, the chief operating officer, personally briefed him on the matter.

Of course, Mr. Fuld’s attorneys have decided to pursue the “incompetent” defense as opposed to taking any responsibility for the situation:

Mr. Fuld’s lawyer said on Thursday that Mr. Fuld “did not know what those transactions were” and wasn’t “aware of their accounting treatment.”

It is unclear what is more shocking:  The prospect of a CEO of a major financial institution willfully pursuing financial transactions designed specifically to mislead investors and counterparties into thinking that the firm was less leveraged than it really was or the idea that the CEO really had no idea that these maneuvers were taking place at all.

Buffett’s Decision on a Lehman Investment

The bankruptcy report also contains some interesting information regarding Lehman’s attempts to have Warren Buffett invest $2 billion in the company as a “stamp of approval”.  Of course, Mr. Buffett decided against doing so when he found problems in Lehman’s 10-K as well as negative signals from Lehman executives who were unwilling to invest in the firm on the same terms he was offered.

As is often the case, we can also look at Mr. Buffett’s statements regarding corporate governance to understand what went wrong at Lehman:

“In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.”

– Warren Buffett’s 2009 Letter to Shareholders.

If Lehman’s story can be distilled down to its core problem, it seems to be that the company’s CEO did not regard himself as the Chief Risk Officer.  Based on Mr. Fuld’s own admission (if we are to believe him), he was not aware of critical accounting policies that misled investors and counterparties who were using Lehman’s financial statements to judge the health of the business.  Of course, the Repo 105 maneuver was only necessary because of other failures to control risk at the firm.

It would be a refreshing change if at least one CEO involved in the demise of a major financial institution would step up and admit that the responsibility was his rather than hiding behind the “incompetence” defense.

The author of this post is a private investor and writer focused on applying value investing techniques to find securities trading well below intrinsic business value. He is a Manual of Ideas contributor and editor of The Rational Walk.

Posted by manualofideas at 04:11 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Last month, we posted Matt Darrah's cautionary thesis on Bunge (BG) and the month before we published his long case for Corporate Executive Board (EXBD). This month, Matt looks at KHD Humboldt Wedag, which recently announced an intention to split into two companies in order to highlight the value of its key assets. You can read the original announcement, dated January 6th, here, and an update, dated March 4th, here. Upon completing his primary research on KHD, Matt decided to take no action on KHD. In the following write-up, Matt explains why he passed on KHD:

Introduction

This month’s recommendation is an example of a company I considered as a potential stock purchase, but ultimately decided not to buy. This stock may represent a compelling investment opportunity for some, but it doesn’t fit with my investment philosophy, so I decided to pass. Note that I do not believe investors should short sell the stock, as it may appreciate in price.

Company Overview

KHD is an industrial plant engineering and equipment supply company for the cement, coal, and minerals processing industries. Their products and services include plant design, equipment design and development, engineering services, and automation services. KHD operates in India, China, Russia, Germany, the Middle East, Australia, South Africa, and the United States.

Valuation

Most investors who like this stock point to its seemingly attractive valuation. KHD is valued at $419MM based on Wednesday’s stock price of $13.93, but the firm had $402MM of net cash as of September 30, 2009 (latest financial statements). Typically, an investor could look at this information, and say that he or she was purchasing KHD for $17MM ($419MM market capitalization less $402MM of cash). However, in this instance that analysis is incorrect.

When buying a stock, an investor should act as if he or she is buying the whole company. KHD has received ~$149MM of customer prepayments for future work. If an investor were buying the whole company, he or she would insist on keeping the cash necessary to complete requested work and not give the cash to the old owners. This business has historically generated ~6% profit margins (94% cost), so it will need almost all of the $149MM to service the business customers have prepaid. Adding that $149MM to the $419MM market capitalization while subtracting the $402MM of cash results in an investor buying the business for $166MM. I believe normalized cash flow is ~$34MM per year, and thus the Company is trading at a 20% FCF yield. Below I will explain why I do not find this free cash flow yield appealing enough to invest in KHD.

Increased Competitive Pressures

KDH faces increased competitive pressures from companies with capabilities that it does not currently possess. Companies such as Bechtel or Fluor can manage the entire construction of a cement plant, including the design and equipment supply. Increasingly, cement manufacturers use these companies to act as the primary contractors, relegating companies like KHD to a subcontractor role. Based on my calls to those familiar with the industry, companies like KHD are selected directly by clients only in order to reduce cost. Additionally, as a subcontractor, KHD faces price pressures from the primary contractor, as it does not have the direct client relationship. Despite the seemingly compelling free cash flow yield, this concern over competitive pressures leads me to doubt the long term sustainability of the KHD’s cash flow generating ability.

The author of this article is Matt Darrah, Chief Investment Officer of MD Capital Management and contributor to The Manual of Ideas. Matt describes his background as follows: "I have been investing since 1998 (age 16) when I saved nearly all my money from working on my winter break from high school, and invested it according to the value investing principles I had read about in Warren Buffett’s shareholder letters and books about value investing. After high school, I attended Southern Methodist University (SMU) in Dallas, Texas, where I graduated summa cum laude with a degree in finance. Post graduation, I worked in investment banking for two years (helping companies raise financing, buy other businesses or sell their businesses) before joining a private equity and debt investment firm, where I have worked for three years. My investing philosophy has been developed through my (i) insatiable reading of books written by and about prominent value investors and their investment philosophy, (ii) 11 years of public market investment experience and (iii) three years of private equity experience, where I have invested and/or manage over $625MM of investments in 6 companies."

Posted by manualofideas at 02:48 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)